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Abstract
We study the problem of election control through
social influence when the manipulator is allowed to
use the locations that she acquired on the network
for sending both positive and negative messages on
multiple candidates, widely extending the previous
results available in the literature that study the in-
fluence of a single message on a single candidate.
In particular, we provide a tight characterization of
the settings in which the maximum increase in the
margin of victory can be efficiently approximated
and of those in which any approximation turns out
to be impossible. We also show that, in simple net-
works, a large class of algorithms, mainly including
all approaches recently adopted for social-influence
problems, fail to compute a bounded approximation
even on very simple networks, as undirected graphs
with every node having a degree at most two or di-
rected trees. Finally, we investigate various exten-
sions and generalizations of the model.
1 Introduction
Nowadays, there is increasing use of social networks to con-
vey inaccurate and unverified information, e.g., hosting the
diffusion of fake news, spread by malicious users for their
illicit goals. This can lead to severe and undesired conse-
quences, as widespread panic, libelous campaigns, and con-
spiracies. In the United States, for instance, there is an ongo-
ing discussion on the power of manipulation of social media
during the US elections in 2016 [Office of The Director of
National Intelligence, 2017] and, more importantly, for fu-
ture elections. Thus, understanding and limiting the adverse
effects on the elections due to information diffusion in social
networks is currently considered of paramount importance.
The problem of election control through social influence
has been recently the object of interest of many works. E.g.,
Sina et al. [2015] show how to modify the relationship among
voters in order to make the desired candidate to win an elec-
tion; Auletta et al. [2015; 2017a; 2017b] show that, in case
of two only candidates, a manipulator controlling the or-
der in which information is disclosed to voters can lead the
minority to become a majority; a similar adversary is stud-
ied by Auletta et al. [2018], showing that such a manipu-
lator can lead a bare majority to consensus; Bredereck and
Elkind [2017] study how selecting seeds from which to dif-
fuse information to manipulate a two-candidate election.
In our paper, we focus on this last kind of manipulation.
More precisely, we assume that a manipulator can buy some
locations on the network from which she kicks off a diffusion
of (potentially fake) news aiming at altering the preference
rankings of the voters receiving them to make the desired can-
didate to win the election. Wilder and Vorobeychik [2018]
have recently studied the case in which a manipulator spreads
information on a single candidate to make her win the elec-
tion or lose the election. The authors also provided approxi-
mation algorithms to compute the optimal seeds for positive
messages only or negative messages only.
However, in elections with more than two candidates, the
assumption that the election control can be either construc-
tive or destructive as well as on a single candidate only is too
limiting. Consider, for example, the setting in Figure 1, char-
acterized by five voters and five candidates, with c0 denoting
the manipulator’s candidate and c1, . . . , c4 denoting the re-
maining candidates. Among the five voters, we assume that
one of them already prefers the manipulator’s candidate c0 to
c4 and these two to the remaining candidates; the preference
of the remaining voters are arranged as follows: one voter
prefers c1 to c0 and these two to the remaining candidates;
one voter prefers c1 to c3 and these two to the remaining can-
didates; one voter prefers c2 to c3 and these two to the remain-
ing candidates; one voter prefers c2 to c4 and these two to the
remaining candidates. We assume that voters are arranged
on a clique and each information is received with probability
one regardless of the sender. Hence, we do not need to care
about which nodes send positive or negative messages since
all voters will always receive these messages. It can be easily
observed that when a message (positive or negative) on a sin-
gle candidate is sent, then the desired candidate c0 cannot be
made to win the election (at most, the election will end with a
tie between c0 and another candidate, both taking two votes).
Instead, injecting the network with a positive message toward
c0 and a negative message toward c2 will result in c0 being the
only node with two votes, and thus the winner. This example
also shows that, differently from what happens in the setting
studied by Wilder and Vorobeychik [2018], the optimal so-
lution can include positive/negative messages on candidates
different from the desired one.
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Figure 1: Clique characterized by five voters and five candidates.
Our Contribution. We focus on the election control prob-
lem when the manipulator is allowed to use the locations that
she acquired on the network for sending both positive and
negative messages on multiple candidates. Our model extends
the one by Wilder and Vorobeychik [2018] and assumes that
diffusion occurs according to a variation of the independent
cascade model [Kempe et al., 2003] able to capture the simul-
taneous spread of multiple messages. We also focus on the
same objective studied by Wilder and Vorobeychik [2018],
that is to maximize the increase in the margin of victory of
the manipulator’s candidate c0.
Under mild assumptions on how a voter revises her prefer-
ence ranking given a set of messages, we provide a tight char-
acterization of the settings in which the maximum increase in
the margin of victory can be efficiently approximated and of
those in which any approximation turns out to be impossible
unless P = NP. Specifically, we prove that whenever there is
a set of τ messages making the candidate initially ranked by
a voter as the least-preferred one to the most-preferred candi-
date, then there is a greedy poly-time algorithm guaranteeing
an approximation factor ρ depending on τ . A surprisingly
sharp transition phase occurs, instead, when no such a set of
messages exists. In this case, no poly-time approximation
algorithm is possible, unless P = NP, even when the approx-
imation factor is a function in the size of the problem.
This last result poses a severe obstacle to the possibility for
a manipulator to successfully alter the outcome of an elec-
tion. Even more importantly, we show that this hardness re-
sult does not hold merely for worst-case (thus, potentially,
knife-edge or rare) instances. Indeed, we prove that a large
class of algorithms, that mainly include all approaches that
have been recently adopted for social-influence problems, fail
to compute an empirically bounded approximation even on
very simple networks, as undirected graphs with every node
having a degree at most two or directed trees. We also ob-
serve that, as a corollary of our characterization, the election
control problem is inapproximable within any factor when
positive only influence or negative only influence is possi-
ble. Let us remark that this inapproximability result is dra-
matically different from that obtained by Wilder and Vorob-
eychik [2018], who show that, when the manipulator spreads
only positive or only negative information on a single candi-
date, a constant approximation can be achieved.
Finally, we study some variants and generalizations of our
model. More precisely, at first, we investigate the case in
which seeds are bribed, i.e., for each seed her ranking (and
thus, her vote) is not affected by messages different from the
one that she sends. Second, we study the case in which one
uses alternative objective functions such as, e.g., the probabil-
ity of victory. Third, we exmplore the case in which the diffu-
sion occurs according to the linear threshold model [Kempe
et al., 2003] and, finally, the case in which different seeds
may have a different cost for the manipulator. We show that
our complexity results also hold in these variants.
2 The Model
We consider an election control problem, defined by a set of
candidates C = {c0, c1, . . . , c`}, and a network of voters,
modeled as a weighted directed graph G = (V,E, p), where
V is the set of voters,E is the set of edges, and p : E → (0, 1]
denotes the strength of the influence among voters. In partic-
ular, with a slight abuse of notation, we denote as p(u, v) the
strength of influence of u on v. Each voter v has a preference
ranking piv over the candidates. We denote as piv(i) the i-th
candidate in the rank piv . At the election time, the voter is
assumed to cast a vote for piv(1). For each candidate c ∈ C,
we also denote as Vc the set of voters that rank c as first, i.e.,
Vc = {v ∈ V | piv(1) = c}.
The election control problem involves a single agent (i.e.,
the manipulator) whose objective is to spend a budget B of
messages to make c0 win the election, by injecting in the net-
work positive or negative information both about c0 and about
the other candidates. Namely, our goal is to find a set of seeds
of V and a set of at most B messages sent by these seeds in
order to maximize the increase in the margin of victory of c0.
Specifically, let S ⊆ V be a subset of voters and I(s) =
(q0, ..., q`) be a vector associated to each s ∈ S, where qi ∈
{−, ·,+}, with qi = + (qi = −, respectively) representing
that s sends a positive (negative, respectively) message about
candidate ci, and qi = · representing that no message is sent
by s about ci. For every s ∈ S, given a vector I(s), we
denote as |I(s)| the number of messages + or − sent by seed
s, i.e., |I(s)| = |{i : qi 6= ·}|. We assume that |I(s)| ≥ 1
for every s ∈ S. We also say that s sends message (c, q) for
c ∈ C and q ∈ {+,−} if I(s, c), i.e., the c-th entry of I(s), is
q. Given (S, I), its cost is defined as the cumulative number
of messages sent by the seeds, i.e.,
∑
s∈S |I(s)|. A solution
(S, I) is feasible does not exceed cost is ≤ B.
For each feasible solution (S, I), messages are supposed
to spread over the network according to a multi-issue inde-
pendent cascade (MI-IC) model. In this model, given the
graph G = (V,E, p), we define the live-graph H = (V,E′),
where each edge (u, v) ∈ E is included inH with probability
p(u, v). In this model, for each candidate c ∈ C and for each
type q ∈ {−,+}, we keep a setAtc,q of active voters at time t.
These sets initially contain the seeds sending the correspond-
ing messages, i.e. A0c,q = {s ∈ S : I(s, c) = q} for every
c, q. Finally, at each time t ≥ 1, we build Atc,q as follows:
for each edge (s, v) ∈ E′, we consider the set M(s, v) of
messages (c, q) such that s ∈ At−1c,q and v /∈
⋃
i<tA
i
c,q; then
for each (s, v) such that M(s, v) is not empty, we add v to
Atc,q for every (c, q) ∈ M(s, v). The diffusion process of the
message (c, q) terminates at time Tc,q such that A
Tc,q
c,q = ∅.
Finally, the cascade terminates when the diffusion of each
message (c, q) terminates.
Roughly speaking, this process models the following real-
istic behavior: each seed s propagates all messages in I(s)
to neighbors; however, a voter v receiving messages from s
may not accept the information that these messages carry: the
acceptance probability indeed depends on the strength of the
influence that s has on v, and hence, we say that v will be
activated by s only with probability p(s, v) and this corre-
sponds to (s, v) being an edge of the live-graph H; finally,
each newly activated voter tries to influence the vote of their
neighbors that have not yet accepted the spreading informa-
tion, and to this aim they simply forward the messages they
received. That is, freshly convinced voters act as new seeds,
and the process continues as long as there is some voter will-
ing to play the role of the seed. Note that we assume that each
node simply forwards all messages that she receives, but each
node processes a given message only once.
The reception by voter v of messages and the acceptance
of their content do not only influence whether v will or not
forward these messages through the network, but also affect
her preference ranking. Denote with R = {(c, q)}c∈C a set
of received messages. A ranking revision function φ asso-
ciates each pair (pi,R) a new ranking pi′ obtained by revising
ranking pi with the set of received messages R. We study a
general class of ranking revision functions, described below,
that extends that one used by Wilder and Vorobeychik [2018].
Given a feasible solution (S, I) and a live graph H , we
let, for every v ∈ V , pi∗v(S, I,H) be the ranking at the end
of the MI-IC model. Moreover, for each candidate c ∈ C,
we also denote as V ∗c the set of voters that rank c as first
at the end of the diffusion process, i.e., V ∗c (S, I,H) ={v ∈ V | pi∗v(1) = c}. We finally let the margin of victory of
(S, I,H) to be
MoV(S, I,H) = |V ∗c0(S, I,H)| −maxc6=c0 |V
∗
c (S, I,H)|,
that denotes the number of votes that c0 needs to win the
election, if the first term is lower than the second, and the
advantage of c0 with respect to the second best ranked candi-
date, otherwise. Finally, the effectiveness of (S, I), denoted
as ∆MoV(S, I,H) is given by the increase in the margin of
victory due to this choice of seeds and messages, i.e.,
∆MoV(S, I,H) = MoV(S, I,H)−MoV(∅, (), H).
Hence, the election control problem consists in computing
(S∗, I∗) = arg max(S,I) EH [∆MoV(S, I,H)], where expec-
tation is taken on the probability of live graphs H .
An algorithm A is said to always return a ρ-approximation
for the election control problem with ρ ∈ [0, 1] potentially
depending on the size of the problem, if, for each instance of
the problem, it returns (S, I) such that EH [∆MoV(S, I,H)] ≥
ρEH [∆MoV(S∗, I∗, H)].
Ranking Revision Functions. We consider a general class
of ranking revision functions φ defined as follows. When
there is a single message on the network, the ranking revision
is as the one prescribed by Wilder and Vorobeychik [2018].
That is, a message (c,+) causes that c switches her posi-
tion with the candidate above, whereas each message (c,−)
causes that c switches her position with the candidate below.
Instead, if v receives both (c,+) and (c,−), then, she dis-
cards them and behaves as if no message was received about
c. When there are messages on multiple candidates, the rank-
ing revision functions φ satisfy the following mild properties.
• Be given a ranking pi and two message sets R,R′, dif-
fering only for a single candidate, say ci, such that R′
contains (ci,−), while R contains (ci,+) or (ci, ·). If
cj 6= ci is the most-preferred candidate of the rank-
ing returned by φ(pi,R), then cj must also be the most-
preferred candidate of the ranking returned by φ(pi,R′).
This is equivalent to say that, if candidate cj is the most
preferred, then she keeps to be the most preferred when
an additional negative message on an alternative candi-
date is received.
• Be given two possible rankings pi, pi′ of a node v that
differ only for the position of candidate cj , in pi not being
worse than in pi′. Be given a message set R. If cj is
the most preferred candidate in the ranking returned by
φ(pi′, R), then cj must be the most preferred also in the
ranking returned by φ(pi,R).
Some examples of ranking revision functions may be pro-
vided, e.g., based on different orderings with which the single
messages of R are applied to switch candidates in the rank-
ing or based on scoring rules. Consider the first case and,
for the sake of presentation, focus on only three candidates.
Consider a voter v with piv = c0  c1  c2. We can have
different resulting rankings for the same set of messages, e.g.:
• (·,−,+), that can result in pi∗v = c2  c0  c1, if we
first apply the change induced by message (c1,−), or in
pi∗v = c0  c2  c1, otherwise;
• (−,−, ·), that can result in pi∗v = c0  c1  c2, if we
first apply the change induced by message (c0,−), or in
pi∗v = c2  c0  c1, otherwise.
Among all the possible φ, we focus on the most extremal
rules: the pessimistic ranking revision function assumes that
every candidate not ranked in the first two positions can never
become the most preferred candidate (thus when applied to
the case of three candidates as described above, it implies
that ties are always broken in favor of the ranking pi∗v such
that pi∗v(1) 6= c2); the optimistic ranking revision function in-
stead does exactly the opposite and always breaks ties by fa-
voring the worst ranked candidate. Now, we consider the case
in which the ranking revision functions are based on scoring
rules and we report an example named score-based. Here,
we assume that exchanged messages have a more prominent
role in the decision about who v will vote with respect to her
initial ranking. In order to describe this function, it would be
convenient to assume that voter v assigns a score to each can-
didate based on her position in piv: she assigns score |C| to
the first-ranked candidate, score |C|− 1 to the second, and so
on; moreover, for each candidate c, the message (c,+) corre-
sponds to increase its score by 1 + ε, and the message (c,−)
corresponds to decrease this score by the same amount; the
final ranking is then computed with respect to these updated
scores. Notice that the score-based ranking revision function
is well defined regardless the number of candidates. Table 1
summarizes the behavior of the pessimistic, optimistic, and
score-based ranking revision functions when |C| = 3.
pessimistic optimistic score-based
(+, any, any) c0 c0 c0
(·,+, any) c1 c1 c1
(·,−, any) c0 c0 c0
(−,+, any) c1 c1 c1
(−, ·,+) c1 c2 c2
(−, ·,−) c1 c1 c1
(−,−,+) c0 c2 c2
(−,−, ·) c0 c2 c0
(−,−,−) c0 c0 c0
Table 1: Most-preferred candidate in the pessimistic, optimistic, and
score-based ranking revision functions with at least two messages.
3 General Results
Initially, we observe that for every ranking revision function,
the following holds:
• given a node whose preferences are such that c0
is the least-preferred candidate, either c0 becomes
the most-preferred candidate by the message set
{(c0,+), (ci,−) for every i > 0 } or there is no R such
that c0 can become the most-preferred candidate;
• if the message set {(c0,+), (ci,−) for every i > 0 }
makes candidate c0 the most-preferred one for a given
ranking pi when c0 is the least-preferred candidate, then
the same message makes c0 the most-preferred candi-
date for any other ranking pi′.
We introduce the following definition that we use to capture
the phase transition of the election control problem.
Definition 1. The pair (φ, |C|) composed of a rank-
ing revision function and a number of candidates
is said least-candidate manipulable if, when c0 is
the least-preferred candidate for a node, message set
{(c0,+), (ci,−) for every i > 0 } does always make c0 be
the most preferred.
3.1 Inapproximability Results
Theorem 1. Be given the set of instances in which (φ, |C|)
is not least-candidate manipulable. For any ρ > 0 even de-
pending on the size of the problem, there is not any poly-time
algorithm returning a ρ-approximation to the election control
problem, unless P = NP.
Proof. The proof uses a reduction from the well-known NP-
hard problem set cover. This problem, given a finite set N =
{z1, . . . , zn} of elements, a collection X = {x1, .., xm} of
X N
Figure 2: Reduction for an election scenario characterized by `+ 1
candidates.
sets with xi ⊆ N , and an integer h, asks whether there is a
collection X∗ ⊆ X such that |X∗| ≤ h and ∪xi∈X∗ xi = N .
Given an instance of set cover, we build an instance of the
election control problem with `+1 candidates as follows. The
voters’ network G, showed in Figure 2, consists of four dis-
connected components, that we denote as G1, . . . , G4. Note
that all edges of G have p(u, v) = 1.
The component G1 has m + n nodes and it used to model
the set cover instance. Indeed, for each zi ∈ N , we have in
G1 a node vzi ; moreover, for each xi ∈ X , we have in G1 a
node vxi with an edge toward vz for each z ∈ xi. All voters v
corresponding to nodes in G1 have ranking piv = c2 > c1 >
c3 > · · · > c` > c0.
The component G2 is a clique of (3`− 5)(m+ n) +m+
`− h− 4 nodes, such that
• 2(m + n) nodes have ranking piv = c2 > c1 > c3 >
. . . > c` > c0;
• 2(m + n) + m − h + 1 nodes have ranking piv = c1 >
c2 > c3 > . . . > c` > c0;
• for every i 6∈ {0, 1, 2}, 3(m+n)+1 nodes have ranking
piv = ci > c2 > c1 > c3 > . . . > ci−1 > ci+1 > . . . >
c` > c0.
The componentG3 is a clique of n+h+1 nodes, such that
every node has ranking piv = c1 > c2 > c3 > . . . > c` > c0.
The componentG4 is a clique of 3(m+n)+2 nodes, such
that every node has ranking piv = c0 > c1 > c2 > c3 >
. . . > c`.
Note that |Vc0 | = 3(m + n) + 2, |Vc1 | = 3(m + n) + 2,|Vc2 | = 3(m + n), and |Vci | = 3(m + n) + 1 for every
i 6= 0, 1, 2. Hence, MoV(∅, (), H) = 0. Finally, we set the
budget B = h+ 1.
We next prove that this instance allows a feasible solution
(S∗, I∗) with MoV(S∗, I∗, H) > 0 if and only if there a set
cover of size at most h.
(If) Let X∗ ⊆ X be the set cover of size h1 (i.e., |X∗| = h
and ∪xi∈X∗ = N ). Then we set (S∗, I∗) as follows: for
1If there is a set cover X∗ of size less h, then we can achieve a
set cover of size exactly h, by padding X∗ with arbitrary element in
X \X∗.
every xi ∈ X∗, we include vxi ∈ S∗ and we set I∗(vxi) such
that q1 = +, and qi = · for every i 6= 1; moreover, we include
in S∗ an arbitrary node v ∈ G3 and we set I∗(v) such that
q2 = +, and qi = · for every i 6= 2.
It directly follows that (S∗, I∗) is feasible. We next show
that MoV(S∗, I∗, H) > 0. Indeed, it directly follows that
|V ∗ci(S∗, I∗, H)| = |Vci | for every i 6= 1, 2. Moreover,
the diffusion of messages leads each voter corresponding to
nodes in G3 to prefer c2 to c1. Moreover, the dynamics
leads h + n voters in G1 (i.e., the seeds and the ones cor-
responding to elements zi ∈ N ) to prefer c1 to c2. Hence,
|V ∗c1(S∗, I∗, H)| = |Vc1 | − |G3| + h + n = 3(m + n) + 1,
and |V ∗c2(S∗, I∗, H)| = |Vc2 |+ |G3|−h−n = 3(m+n)+1.
Hence, MoV(S∗, I∗, H) = 1, as desired.
(Only if) Suppose that there exists a pair (S∗, I∗) such that
MoV(S∗, I∗, H) > 0. Note that, since c0 is ranked either as
the first or as the last by all voters and the instance is not
least-candidate manipulable, then |V ∗c0(S∗, I∗, H)| = |Vc0 |.
Hence, in order to have MoV(S∗, I∗, H) > 0, it must be the
case that the number of voters whose most-preferred candi-
date is c1 decreases by at least one unit, the number of voters
whose most-preferred candidate is c2 increases by at most one
unit, and the number of voters whose most-preferred candi-
date is ci, for i 6∈ {0, 1, 2}, does not increase.
We first consider the clique G2, proving two important
properties. Suppose, that a candidate ci loses votes in favor
of cj . Then there is a voter receiving messages that allow cj
to pass in the ranking candidate ci. However, since G2 is a
clique, all nodes receive these messages, and thus all votes of
ci are taken by cj . Moreover, no candidate can take the votes
of another candidate without losing her initial votes, other-
wise she would have at least 4(m + n) + m − h + 1 votes
and MoV(S∗, I∗, H) ≤ 0. We can now prove that c2 cannot
change her voters in G2. Suppose c2 gains votes in G2 and
another candidate cj takes her votes. Notice that cj must lose
her initial votes. Since the rankings of the voters of c2 and
cj differ only for the ranking of cj and all voters receive the
same messages, the second assumption on the ranking revi-
sion function (see previous section) is not satisfied.
Then, c2 must take voter inG3. Again, sinceG3 is a clique,
it must be that all votes of c1 are taken by candidate c2.
Thus, c1 loses all its voters inG3 in favor of c2. Note that a
single message is sufficient (a positive message for c2) to this
aim. However, this implies that c2 must lose n + h voters in
G1, otherwise |V ∗c2(S∗, I∗, H)| > 3(m + n) + n + h + 1 −
(n + h) and thus MoV(S∗, I∗, H) ≤ 0, that contradicts our
hypothesis. Observe that these votes must be necessarily lost
in favor of c1.
Hence, we are left with h available messages to make n+
h voters to change their vote from c2 to c1. Observe that,
in order to make a voter to change, it is sufficient a single
message (a positive message for c1). However, if less than h
seeds sending this message are located among nodes vxi for
xi ∈ X , then less than n + h voters will change their mind
(since nodes vxi for xi ∈ X have no ingoing edges).
Finally, we must have that the h seeds in G1 are neigh-
bors of every node vzi for zi ∈ N . Hence, the set X∗ ={xi : vxi ∈ S∗} has size h and, by construction of G1,⋃
x∈X∗ x = N , i.e. X
∗ is a set cover of size at most h.
Hence we can conclude that a feasible solution (S∗, I∗)
with ∆MoV(S∗, I∗, H) > 0 exists if and only if a solu-
tion for set cover exists. Note also that if a solution with
∆MoV(S
∗, I∗, H) > 0 exists, then ∆MoV(S, I,H) > 0 even
for any ρ-approximate solution (S, I), regardless of the value
of ρ. Thus, if a polynomial time ρ-approximate algorithm for
election control problem exists, then the set cover problem
can also be solved in poly-time, implying that P = NP.
Remark 1. For sake of presentation, in the above proof we
considered a disconnected graph. However, if we restrict ρ to
be upper bounded by an exponential function of the size of the
problem, the proof can be immediately extended to strongly
connected graphs, by adding in the graph described above r
edges to make it strongly connected. If we denote with ε > 0
the weight of these edges, we observe that there are 2r − 1
live graphs involving at least one of these edges, and each of
them has probability at most ε. Moreover, in each of these
live graphs H , it holds −|N | ≤ MoV(S∗, I∗, H) ≤ |N |,
where N is the set of nodes in the above proof. Thus,
by denoting with H∗ the live graph that does not involve
any of these edges, we have that EH [MoV(S∗, I∗, H)] =
MoV(S∗, I∗, H∗) · Pr(H∗) + ∑H 6=H∗ MoV(S∗, I∗, H) ·
Pr(H). If we assume MoV(S∗, I∗, H∗) = 1, then
EH [MoV(S∗, I∗, H)] ≥ (1−(2r−1)ε)−(2r−1)|N |ε. If, in-
stead, MoV(S∗, I∗, H∗) = 0, then EH [MoV(S∗, I∗, H)] ≤
(2r − 1)|N |ε. If ε < ρ(2r−1)((ρ+1)|N |+ρ) , we have that any
ρ-approximate solution (S′, I ′) has EH [MoV(S′, I ′, H)] >
|N |
(2r−1)((ρ+1)|N |+ρ) in the case that MoV(S
∗, I∗, H∗) = 1
and EH [MoV(S′, I ′, H)] < ρ|N |(2r−1)((ρ+1)|N |+ρ) otherwise.
Hence, any ρ-approximate equilibrium is able to distin-
guish whether MoV(S∗, I∗, H∗) = 1 or not, and thus to solve
the set cover problem.
Theorem 1 essentially states that whenever there is no way
for making the least-preferred candidate for a node to become
the most-preferred one of that node, then there is no chance
that a manipulator designs an algorithm allowing her to max-
imize the increment in the margin of victory of the desired
candidate regardless the adopted ranking revision function.
However, Theorem 1 does not rule out that the worst-case in-
stances on which the manipulator’s algorithm fails are very
rare and/or knife-edge. Even if this was the case, we show
that, if the manipulator greedily chooses the messages to
send, then her approach fails even for simple graphs, namely
graphs with all nodes having a degree of 2 or trees.
Specifically, given a set S of seeds and corresponding mes-
sages I , we denote as F(S, I) the set of pairs (s, I(s)), with
s /∈ S such that either EH [MoV(S ∪ {s}, (I, I(s)), H)] >
EH [MoV(S, I,H)] or EH
[
V ∗c0(S ∪ {s}, (I, I(s)), H)
]
>
EH
[
V ∗c0(S, I,H)
]
. That is, F(S, I) includes all the ways
of augmenting a current solution so that either the margin of
victory of c0 or the number of its votes increases. Then, we
say that an algorithm to solve the election control problem
uses the greedy approach, if it works as follows:
• it starts with S = ∅ and I = ();
• until the setF(S, I) is not empty, choose one (s, I(s)) ∈
F(S, I) and set S = S ∪ {s} and I = (I, I(s)).
We then show that every algorithm in this class fails even for
very simple networks.
Proposition 1. Be given the set of instances in which (φ, |C|)
is not least-candidate manipulable. For any ρ > 0 even de-
pending on the size of the problem, no algorithm following
the greedy approach returns a ρ-approximation, even in undi-
rected graphs in which each node has degree at most 2.
Proof. Consider the graph given in Figure 3. According to
the preference rankings of the nodes, the candidate c2 collects
5 votes, while candidates c1 and c0 gather 7 votes each. So
the actual margin is equal to zero. Suppose the budgetB be 2.
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Figure 3: example of a small undirected network in which the greedy
algorithm performs badly (|A| = 3, |B| = 2).
Since, except for the nodes that already vote for her, c0
is always ranked as third, it is clear that she cannot get
any further vote. Then, in order to increase the margin
of victory of c0, we have that c2 must obtain some of the
c1’s votes. The optimal solution (S∗, I∗) is that, while c0
keeps 7 votes, c1 and c2 collect 6 votes each, providing
EH [MoV(S∗, I∗, H)] = 1. This can be obtained by forc-
ing I(v) = (·, ·,+) for a single v ∈ A and I(w) = (·,+, ·)
for a single w ∈ B.
However, this solution cannot be found by any algorithm
adopting the greedy approach described above. Indeed, we
next show thatF(∅, ()) is empty, and thus the algorithm never
adds any seed in S: clearly, F(∅, ()) cannot contain any pair
(s, I(s)) that increases the number of votes of c0; moreover,
by seeding a node in the seven-node ring the margin of vic-
tory clearly cannot increase (it either remains unchanged, or
it decreases if c0 ceases to be the best ranked candidate); sim-
ilarly, by seeding a node in the four-node ring or in A, either
the margin of victory goes down (if c2 passes c1) or remains
unchanged; finally, by seeding one of the remaining nodes
either the margin of victory goes down (if c1 passes c2) or
remains unchanged.
Hence, the greedy solution results in a zero margin of vic-
tory, and thus it cannot be a ρ-approximation.
Proposition 2. Be given the set of instances in which
(φ, |C|) is not least-candidate manipulable. For any ρ > 0
even depending logarithmically in the size of the problem,
no algorithm following the greedy approach returns a ρ-
approximation to the election problem, even in directed trees.
Proof. Let r > 2ρ , and consider the graph given in Figure 4.
According to the ranking preferences of the nodes, the can-
didate c2 collects 5r votes, while candidates c1 and c0 gather
7r votes each. Then, the actual margin of victory is equal to
zero. As in the previous case, suppose the budget B be 2.
Figure 4: example of a tree in which the greedy algorithm performs
badly.
As above, we have that c0 cannot raise any more vote, and
we need that c2 takes some of the c1 votes. The optimal solu-
tion (S∗, I∗) is then obtained forcing that S∗ = {x, y} with
I(x) = (·, ·,+) and I(y) = (·,+, ·), and the expected margin
of victory is r.
However, this solution cannot be found by any algorithm
adopting the greedy approach. Indeed, as above, we have that
no pair (s, I(s)) can increase the number of votes of c0; more-
over, by seeding a node in A1 the margin of victory clearly
cannot increase (it either remains unchanged, or it decreases
if c0 ceases to be the best ranked candidate); by seeding a
node in A4 or in A5, either the margin of victory goes down
(if c1 passes c1) or remains unchanged; finally, by seeding the
root of A1 or the root of A2, either the margin of victory goes
down (if c2 passes c1) or remains unchanged. Hence, the only
action that the greedy algorithm can take would be to select
as seed either a leaf of A1, or a leaf of A2 and letting them to
change its vote from c1 to c2. By repeating the argument, we
have that the two seeds selected by a greedy algorithm, must
be two leafs fromA1∪A2. So, the expected margin of victory
is 2, resulting in an approximation factor of 2r < ρ.
Remark 2. Another less natural class of greedy algorithms
would dictate to choose the next seed so that the second most
voted candidate loses some votes (even if this does not in-
crease the margin of victory). It is not hard to see that the
example deployed in Proposition 2 still proves that even this
class of algorithms fails even for very simple graphs.
We recall that greedy algorithms are essentially the only
known algorithms guaranteeing bounded approximations for
many problems related to the election control problem, such
as the well-known influence maximization problem. Hence,
even if an algorithm exists enabling the manipulator to con-
trol the election on many instances, Proposition 1 and Propo-
sition 2 show that new approaches are necessary to design it.
3.2 Approximation Results
We next show that the condition behind the inapproximabil-
ity results is tight. Indeed, by dropping that condition, we can
design poly-time constant-approximation algorithms. More-
over, these algorithms turn out to follow the greedy approach
that we proved to fail even for simple structure whenever the
least-preferred candidate cannot be made to win.
Before presenting our result, let us introduce the follow-
ing definition: given a live graph H and a choice of seeds S,
the influence χ(S,H) is defined to be the number of voters
that are activated by these seeds: note that these are exactly
the nodes that are reachable in the live-graph H by at least
one seed in S. In what follows, we assume, for sake of pre-
sentation, that the expected influence EH [χ(S,H)] can be
computed in poly-time. However, if this is not the case, we
can still use a Monte Carlo simulation to approximate the ex-
pected influence within a factor γ, for every γ > 0. It turns
out that, using such an approximation in place of the correct
value for EH [χ(S,H)] will alter the approximation ratio of
the proposed algorithms only for an additive factor ε = ε(γ)
as discussed by Kempe et al. [2003].
Theorem 2. Be given the set of instances in which (φ, |C|) is
least-candidate manipulable. Call τ ≤ `+1 the cardinality of
the smallest set of messages making c0 be the most preferred
for every initial preference ranking. There is a greedy poly-
time algorithm returning a ρ-approximation to the election
control problem, with
ρ =
B − τ + 1
2τB
(
1− 1
e
)
.
Proof. Let I∗ be the set of τ messages that cause a voter
to vote for c0, whatever was the ranking before the re-
ception of these messages. Notice that since the instance
is least-candidate manipulable at least the set of messages
{(c0,+), (ci,−) for every i > 0 } satisfies this property. Our
algorithm selects
⌊
B
τ
⌋
seeds through the greedy algorithm to
maximize EH [χ(S,H)] (i.e., take at each time the seed that
most increases this quantity), and let each of them to send all
messages in I∗. It directly follows that this algorithm runs in
poly-time in greedy fashion.
In order to formally prove the approximation factor of this
algorithm for the election control problem, let us denote with
Sˆ the set of seeds returned by our algorithm, with S∗ the set
of seeds maximizing EH [∆MoV(S, I∗, H)], with S′ the set of
seeds of sizeB that maximizes EH [χ(S,H)] and with S′′ the
set of seeds of size k =
⌊
B
τ
⌋
that maximizes EH [χ(S,H)].
It is known that the function EH [χ(S,H)] is mono-
tonic and submodular on S [Kempe et al., 2003], i.e.,
EH [χ(S,H)] ≤ EH [χ(T,H)] and EH [χ(S ∪ {x}, H)] −
EH [χ(S,H)] ≥ EH [χ(T ∪ {x}, H)]− EH [χ(T,H)] for ev-
ery S ⊆ T and every x /∈ T . Consequently, the greedy
algorithm is known to return, for every k, a set of k seeds
whose influence is an
(
1− 1e
)
-approximation of the maxi-
mum expected influence achievable with k seeds [Kempe et
al., 2003]. Hence, we have that:
EH [χ(Sˆ,H)] ≥
(
1− 1
e
)
EH [χ(S′′, H)]. (1)
Note that |Vc| − EH [|V ∗c (S∗, I∗, H)|] ≤ EH [χ(S∗, H)]
for every c 6= c0, since at most one vote can be lost by c for
every influenced node in graph H . Then we have
max
c 6=c0
|Vc| − EH
[
max
c 6=c0
|V ∗c (S∗, I∗, H)|
]
≤ max
c 6=c0
{
|Vc| − EH [|V ∗c (S∗, I∗, H)|]
}
≤ EH [χ(S∗, H)] .
(2)
A similar argument proves that
EH
[∣∣V ∗c0(S∗, I∗, H)∣∣]− |Vc0 | ≤ EH [χ(S∗, H)] . (3)
Moreover,
EH [χ(S′,H)]
|S′| ≤
EH [χ(S′,H)]
|S′′| , by submodularity
of χ. Since |S′| = B and |S′′| = ⌊Bτ ⌋ ≥ B−τ+1τ , we then
achieve that
EH [χ(S′, H)] ≤ τB
B − τ + 1EH [χ(S
′′, H)] . (4)
Moreover, by definition of ∆MoV, EH [∆MoV(S∗, I∗, H)] =
(EH
[∣∣V ∗c0(S∗, I∗, H)∣∣]−EH [maxc6=c0 |V ∗c (S∗, I∗, H)|])−
(|Vc0 | −maxc6=c0 |Vc|). Hence, we directly achieve that
EH [∆MoV(S∗, I∗, H)] = (EH
[∣∣V ∗c0(S∗, I∗, H)∣∣]− |Vc0 |) +
(EH [maxc6=c0 |V ∗c (S∗, I∗, H)|]−maxc6=c0 |Vc|). Putting all
together, we then have that
EH [∆MoV(S∗, I∗, H)]
≤ 2EH [χ(S∗, H)] (by (2) and (3))
≤ 2EH [χ(S′, H)] (by definition of S′)
≤ 2τB
B − τ + 1EH [χ(S
′′, H)] (by (4))
≤ 2τB
B − τ + 1
(
1− 1
e
)−1
EH
[
χ(Sˆ,H)
]
(by (1))
≤ 2τB
B − τ + 1
(
1− 1
e
)−1
EH
[
∆MoV(Sˆ, I
∗, H)
]
,
where the last inequality follows from the fact that, by defini-
tion of I∗, all influenced nodes will vote for c0.
3.3 Special Cases
We next show some specific results for the special ranking
revision functions discussed in Section 2. Since pessimistic
ranking revision function is not least-candidate manipulable
for three candidates, then Theorem 1 applies, and thus we
have the following.
Proposition 3. For every ρ > 0 even depending on the size of
the problem, unless P = NP there is no poly-time algorithm
returning a ρ-approximation to the election problem with pes-
simistic ranking revision function, for only three candidates.
By focusing on optimistic ranking revision function, we
have that two negative messages about c1 and c2, i.e.
(·,−,−), are sufficient to make c0 first for every initial rank-
ing. Hence, we can apply Theorem 2 with τ = 2, and we
have the following.
Proposition 4. There is a greedy poly-time algorithm that re-
turns a ρ-approximation to the election control problem with
optimistic ranking revision function for three candidates, with
ρ =
B − 1
4B
(
1− 1
e
)
≈ 1
4
(
1− 1
e
)
.
The result holds even if only negative influences are allowed.
Differently from the optimistic ranking revision function,
for the score-based one, (·,−,−) is not sufficient for make c0
first when she is last in the initial ranking. For this reason,
to ensure that c0 reaches the first position, three messages
are needed, namely (+,−,−). Hence, from Theorem 2 we
achieve the following.
Proposition 5. There is a greedy poly-time algorithm that re-
turns a ρ-approximation to the election control problem with
score-based ranking revision function for three candidates,
with
ρ =
B − 2
6B
(
1− 1
e
)
≈ 1
6
(
1− 1
e
)
.
Moreover, differently from the optimistic ranking revision
function, for the score-based one the approximation guaran-
tee ceases to hold if only negative influences are allowed. In-
deed, in this case there is no way for the last ranked candidate
to become the first one, and thus Theorem 1 holds.
Proposition 6. For every ρ > 0 even depending on the size
of the problem, unless P = NP, then, even for only three
candidates, there is no poly-time algorithm returning a ρ-
approximation to the election problem with score-based rank-
ing revision function if only negative influences are allowed.
We show that, whereas an approximation algorithm exists
for the optimistic ranking revision function with only negative
influence, this result does not carry on to the case that only
positive influence is allowed. Indeed, in this case, there is
no way to raise the rank of the last candidate up to the first
position, and thus Theorem 1 applies.
Proposition 7. For every ρ > 0 even depending on the size
of the problem, unless P = NP, then, even for only three
candidates and optimistic ranking revision function, there is
no polynomial time algorithm returning a ρ-approximation to
the election problem if only positive influences are allowed.
To conclude, we extend the above results to the case of
score-based tie-breaking rule with four or more candidates.
We recall that this tie-breaking rule is well-defined for every
number of candidates. More precisely, it turns out that having
more candidates makes the problem even harder. Indeed, with
more than three candidates, there is no way of pushing the last
ranked candidate up to the first rank, even with score-based
tie-breaking rules, and hence Theorem 1 holds.
Proposition 8. For every ρ > 0 even depending on the size
of the problem, if there are at least four candidates, then,
unless P = NP, there is no poly-time algorithm returning
a ρ-approximation to the election problem with score-based
tie-breaking rule.
4 Extensions
We describe some extensions and variants of our model and
show how most of our results extend to these settings.
4.1 Bribed Voters
In the model described in Section 2, seeds act as initiators
of positive and negative messages about candidates. How-
ever, apart from that, their behavior is exactly the same as
any other node in the network. In particular, the messages
that they receive will affect their ranking and, consequently,
their vote. We now consider also a variant of this scenario,
in which seeds are bribed, i.e., for each seed her preference
ranking (and thus, her vote) is not affected by messages dif-
ferent from the one that she sends.
It directly follows that the reduction described in the proof
of Theorem 1 does not work in this setting. However, we next
show that, even in this setting, the election control problem is
essentially inapproximable.
Theorem 3. Be given the set of instances in which the pairs
composed of tie-breaking rule and number of candidates are
not least-candidate manipulable. For any ρ > 0 there is no
poly-time algorithm returning a ρ-approximation to the elec-
tion problem with bribed seeds, unless P = NP.
Proof Sketch. Consider the reduction described in the proof
of Theorem 1, except that now each node is enlarged into a
clique of size (h + 1)ρ′, where ρ′ > ρ. Hence, if a set cover
of size at most h exists, then, ∆MoV(S∗, I∗, H) ≥ (h+ 1)ρ′,
otherwise the only nodes that eventually change opinion are
the seeds, that are at most h + 1. Thus any ρ-approximate
algorithm must be able to distinguish these two cases and thus
solves the set cover problem in poly-time.
Instead, it is easy to check that Theorem 2 is unaffected by
bribed voters, and so a constant approximation is still possible
when there is a set of messages able to lead the last ranked
candidate to the first place.
4.2 Other Objective Functions
In addition to the maximization of the increase in the margin
of victory, also studied by Wilder and Vorobeychik [2018],
alternative objective functions may be of interest.
For example, one may want to maximize the probability
of victory. For this objective function, already discussed
by Wilder and Vorobeychik [2018], it is not trivial to see that
Theorem 1 keeps holding. However, notice that this objective
function makes the problem even harder than maximizing the
margin of victory. Indeed, for the latter objective, Theorem 2
implies that a 12
(
1− 1e
)
-approximation can be computed in
poly-time when only two candidates are involved. It is instead
not hard to see that, in order to maximize the probability of
victory when only two candidates are equivalent, it is suffi-
cient that all selected seeds send the same message. Hence,
for two candidates, maximizing the probability of victory in
our setting is the same as doing it in the setting of Wilder and
Vorobeychik [2018]. Hence, the problem cannot be approx-
imate, unless P = NP, within a factor ρ > 0, even for two
only candidates.
An apparently weaker goal would be that one of computing
the set of seeds and the corresponding messages so that the
probability of victory merely is above a given threshold (so
the set of feasible solutions would be larger than in the setting
described above). Unfortunately, this objective function does
not make the problem easier to be solved. Indeed, not only
Theorem 1 holds in this setting regardless than the threshold,
but one may show that, as for the goal of maximizing the
probability of victory, the inapproximability still holds when
only two candidates are available.
4.3 Threshold Dynamics
The results we derived in the previous sections and based
to a multi-issue independent cascade model can be extended
to settings in which the diffusion model is linear threshold.
This model represents the most prominent among the diffu-
sion models alternative to the independent cascade. In the lin-
ear threshold model, for each node v of the network, there is
a threshold θv drawn randomly in [0, 1], and incoming edges
(u, v) have a weight wu,v such that
∑
(u,v) wu,v = 1. Then,
a node v becomes active at time t only if the sum of weights
of edges coming from active nodes passes the threshold.
It is easy to check that this diffusion model leads to differ-
ent dynamics with respect to the independent cascade model.
Still, we show that our proofs can be adapted. In particular,
Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 still hold.
Specifically, for the inapproximability result, we use, in
place of set cover, a reduction from vertex cover. This is the
problem of deciding whether, given a graph Z of m nodes
and an integer k, there is a subset S of at most k nodes of
Z such that every edge of Z has at least one endpoint in S.
The reduction is similar to the one described in Theorem 1.
Namely, the component G1 consists of the graph G. Now by
setting n = m − k, we let components G2 − G4 to have the
same number of nodes as in the proof of Theorem 1, except
that now the nodes in each components are not arranged as a
clique, but as a directed ring (so that a message sent by a node
in one component will activate all nodes in that component
regardless of their threshold). Notice that, by considering the
same initial rankings as in the proof of Theorem 1, the margin
of victory of c0 in this instance can become greater than 0 if
and only if there is in G a vertex cover of size at most k.
On the other side, it directly follows that the greedy al-
gorithm proposed in Theorem 2 works, with the same ap-
proximation factor, even with the linear threshold diffusion
model. Indeed, it is known that the influence maximization is
a monotonic and submodular function even with this dynam-
ics [Kempe et al., 2003]. However, it can be observed that
this is sufficient to make the proof of Theorem 2 hold.
4.4 Seeds with Different Costs
In our model we assume that each node can be selected as a
seed at same cost. This can be highly unrealistic. Hence, an
extension to our model would be to assume that each node u
has a different cost w(u) that should be payed for each mes-
sage initiated by that node.
Intuitively, this extension makes the election control prob-
lem harder. Hence, inapproximability results clearly ex-
tend to this setting too. Interestingly, however, we have
that, whenever there are messages such that the last ranked
candidate can be driven to the first position, a poly-time
algorithm returning a constant approximation to the elec-
toral control problem exists even if nodes have heteroge-
neous seeding costs. Indeed, it is known that in this set-
ting there is a poly-time algorithm for influence maximiza-
tion returning a
(
1− 1√
e
)
-approximation of the optimal seed
set [Nguyen and Zheng, 2013]. Then, the arguments of the
proof of Theorem 2 immediately prove that this algorithm
provides a ρ-approximation for the extension of the elec-
tion control problem to voters with different costs, where
ρ = B−τ+12`B
(
1− 1√
e
)
.
5 Conclusions and Future Work
In this work, we analyzed the problem of manipulating the
result of an election by seeding the network with messages
both positive and negative towards the candidates. We prove
a tight characterization of the settings in which computing an
approximation to the best manipulation can be infeasible or
feasible. Specifically, we show that a transition phase exists
when we pass from a setting where the last ranked candidate
for a voter can never be promoted to the most-preferred one to
the settings in which this promotion is allowed, and this holds
regardless the ranking revision function one can use. We both
applied these results to special cases and showed how to gen-
eralize them to hold even for variants and/or generalizations
of the original model. We also show that, in simple net-
works, a large class of algorithms, that mainly include all ap-
proaches recently adopted for social-influence problems, fail
to compute an empirically bounded approximation even on
very simple networks, as undirected graphs with every node
having a degree at most two or directed trees.
Nevertheless, we believe that our results can be refined to
have a more detailed picture of the problem. For example,
our inapproximability results are achieved by assuming that
the underlying network is directed. It would then be interest-
ing to understand whether these results extend to undirected
graphs or the latter embeds features that can be exploited by
a manipulator even if the last ranked candidate cannot be pro-
moted to the first position. We note that an adaption the proof
of Theorem 1 along the line of the reduction for influence
maximization described by Khanna and Lucier [2014] can be
used to prove partial results in this direction, namely that in-
approximability holds even for undirected graphs whenever
we have both heterogeneous seeding costs and the weight of
each vote changing from voter to voter. More in general, a
finer characterization of the network structure for which ma-
nipulation is hard/easy would be of extreme interest.
While we provided a poly-time constant-approximation al-
gorithm in many settings, we did not try to optimize the ap-
proximation ratio. Hence, it would be interesting to design
algorithms that can improve on ours. Finally, it would be in-
teresting to analyze other generalizations of our model, e.g.,
different models for information diffusion and time-evolving
networks.
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